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The Government Can Read Your Mind: 
Can the Constitution Stop It? 
Mara Boundy 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”) technology produces a four-
dimensional map of brain activity, such as perception, memory, emotion, and movement. 
fMRI scans track the flow of blood to the various regions of the brain in real time and 
reveal the subject’s response to particular stimulus. For example, an fMRI scan might 
reveal blood flow to a subject’s memory center in response to a picture of the house in 
which she was raised. On the one hand, this technology seems to produce a model of a 
physical attribute and offer insight into the workings of the human brain. On the other, 
fMRI scans seem to read our minds and disclose our thoughts. The full range of 
applications of fMRI technology is just emerging, but proponents have already sought its 
admission in court as a type of lie detector or credibility builder. If fMRI scans are 
incorporated into the government’s investigatory process, constitutional safeguards 
should be in place to protect the fundamental right of privacy and an individual’s 
freedom to decide whether to assist the state. This Note proposes that the results of fMRI 
scans are testimonial evidence: first, because the scans reveal the subject’s knowledge or 
beliefs, and second, because this classification ensures that fMRI scan results are afforded 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment. If fMRI scans are privileged under the Fifth 
Amendment, the government cannot compel an individual to submit to the scan and 
reveal the contents of her mind. 
 
  J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.A., Trinity College. 
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In George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Thought Police 
monitor the thoughts of citizens, trolling for any hint of forbidden 
viewpoints.1 In 2012, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”) 
of the brain may accomplish similar ends. Developed to aid cognitive 
neuroscientists in understanding which parts of the human brain are 
responsible for functions such as memory, speech, and perception, fMRI 
brain scans are able to track, in real time, the flow of blood to the various 
parts of the brain.2 The fMRI scan’s ability to reveal neural substrates of 
perception, emotion, and movement, as opposed to mere structure, 
differentiates fMRI from other brain imaging techniques like the CT 
scan.3 The imaging reveals the distinct areas to which the subject’s blood 
flows “when making a movement, thinking of a loved one, or telling a 
lie.”4 
Although fMRI was developed for diagnostic purposes, its future 
use has the potential to be more far-reaching. Some private firms already 
offer fMRI brain scans to clients who seek risk definition, fraud 
detection, or more accurate consumer research.5 In addition, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, a primary innovation engine of the 
Department of Defense, is also investigating the uses of fMRI brain scans.6 
 
 1. See generally George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (2011). 
 2. See generally Scott A. Huettel et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (2d ed. 
2008). 
 3. Richard Robinson, fMRI Beyond the Clinic: Will It Ever Be Ready for Prime Time?, 2 PLoS 
Biology 715, 715 (2004). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., No Lie MRI, Inc., http://noliemri.com/customers/Overview.htm (last visited July 1, 
2012); Mindsign Neuromarketing, http://mindsignonline.com/ (last visited July 1, 2012). 
 6. DARPA’s budgets for fiscal years 2007–2010 list projects involving fMRI. Def. Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates: 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide: Vol. I—Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency 213–15 (2009); Def. Advanced Research Projects Agency. 
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In a post-9/11 world, where the boundaries of personal liberty are in 
constant tension with the goals of national security, it is easy to envision 
the governmental use of fMRI brain scans as a quick and efficient way of 
identifying terror suspects.7 This Note addresses whether the use of fMRI 
brain scanning in the investigatory process triggers safeguards sufficient 
to protect an individual’s constitutional rights.8 Specifically, given the 
nuanced information revealed by the scans, would this type of evidence 
constitute testimony and warrant Miranda warnings and the protection of 
the Fifth Amendment? Conversely, would the results of an fMRI scan be 
mere physical evidence that is untethered from constitutional protections 
and able to be compelled of any government detainee? 
I.  Lie Back, Relax, and Let Us Extract Your Testimony 
fMRI maps human brain function by measuring the brain’s blood 
flow and oxygenation in conjunction with mental operations.9 Like 
traditional magnetic resonance imaging, a magnet causes molecules of the 
subject’s body, mainly hydrogen, to align with a magnetic field.10 Each 
mental process, from movement to speech to perception, corresponds to 
an increased flow of blood to particular areas in the brain.11 This blood 
carries more oxygen, which stimulates the magnetic properties of the 
region and increases the signal that the magnetic resonance imaging 
machine can detect.12 The fMRI is distinguishable from traditional 
magnetic resonance imaging technology, such as CT scans, because it 
 
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates: Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation, Defense-Wide: Vol. I—Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 14–15 
(2008). DARPA also funded a study that resulted in the 2005 publication Telling Truth from Lie in 
Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie 
in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 Hum. Brain Mapping 262, 271 (2005).  
 7. In 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the 
Pentagon, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
Department of Homeland Security to determine whether and how the agencies planned to use 
technologies such as fMRI brain scans. ACLU Seeks Information About Government Use of Brain 
Scanners in Interrogations, Am. Civil Liberties Union (June 28, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/ 
technology-and-liberty/aclu-seeks-information-about-government-use-brain-scanners-interrogations. 
 8. This Note considers the implications of admitting fMRI brain scans into court. It should be 
noted that fMRI brain scans have not yet been deemed reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
and they must satisfy the Frye and/or Daubert tests for admissibility of scientific evidence. See Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
589–92 (1993). 
 9. See generally Heuttel et al., supra note 2. 
 10. Edson Amaro Jr. & Gareth J. Barker, Study Design in fMRI: Basic Principles, 60 Brain & 
Cognition 220, 221 (2006). 
 11. Randy L. Buckner & Jessica M. Logan, Functional Neuroimaging Methods: PET and fMRI, in 
Handbook of Functional Neuroimaging of Cognition 27, 28 (Roberto Cabeza & Alan Kingstone 
eds., 2001). 
 12. Id.; N.F. Ramsey et al., Functional MRI Experiments: Acquisition, Analysis and Interpretation 
of Data, 12 European Neuropsychopharmacology 517, 519 (2002). 
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produces a four-dimensional map of brain activity.13 For example, in 
response to particular stimuli, such as photographs, the recitation of facts, 
or questioning, the fMRI tracks the real-time flow of blood to the various 
regions of the brain responsible for each mental activity.14 This tracking 
results in an fMRI scan that reveals which mental process a subject has in 
response to each stimulus. The real-time scan of a brain perceiving new 
information looks different than a scan of a brain remembering or 
perceiving information with which it is familiar.15 In other words, if a 
particular subject is shown a photograph of a person who is unknown to 
the subject, the brain scan will look different than it would if the subject 
knows the person. 
The fMRI has the potential to become an advanced and reliable 
polygraph test.16 Although the reliability of fMRI scans may not yet meet 
the standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,17 investigating the 
potential constitutional implications of their use is still imperative.18 The 
constitutional rights implicated by fMRI scans, especially the protection 
 
 13. Buckner & Logan, supra note 11, at 32 (noting that images of the whole brain can be acquired 
in two seconds); Ramsey et al., supra note 12, at 518 (“The series of scans is stored as a time-series of 
3D volumes . . . .”). 
 14. Buckner & Logan, supra note 11, at 32–33 (discussing options for study designs and 
corresponding efficacies). 
 15. Most often, the fMRI scans are run in batches and are used for comparative purposes. 
Matthew Baptiste Holloway, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words: Images of Brain Activity 
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 Temp. J. Sci. Tech & Envtl. L. 141, 148 (2008). 
Sometimes scans of different subjects are compared to study differences in brain activity between 
different groups of subjects. Id. “[M]eaningful results,” however, “have been detected on the single-
subject level. . . . [and fMRI can] be a useful tool for the forensic analysis of criminal suspects.” Id. 
 16. See generally Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation Jurisprudence?, 
33 Am. J.L. & Med. 341 (2007) (analyzing the constitutional issues implicated by fMRI technology and 
arguing for a cautious approach in admitting fMRI evidence due to its privacy implications). 
 17. The use of fMRI scans in litigation is limited because of the novelty of the technology. As the 
Court noted in Daubert and as is reflected in the amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702, to be 
admissible the fMRI must prove a reliable application to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702; 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). For example, in United States v. 
Saelee, the District Court of Alaska excluded testimony by a handwriting expert because, although the 
expert could identify undisguised handwriting, the evidence failed to show that the handwriting at 
issue was in fact undisguised and unaltered, and the proponent offered no evidence as to how any 
disguise or variation might have affected the expert’s error rate. 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (D. Alaska 
2001). In Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, the state was allowed to admit results of an 
fMRI scan in an attempt to demonstrate how exposure to media violence—namely, the violent video 
games at issue in that case—affects brain activity. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
Conversely, in United States v. Semrau, a magistrate judge excluded an fMRI scan offered to bolster 
the credibility of a testifying witness and to demonstrate that he did not commit fraud because it did 
not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. No. 07-1004 M1/P, 2010 WL 6845092, 
at *16 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). The Semrau judge rejected the fMRI scan specifically because it 
found that the error rate of real-world applications could not be calculated based on fMRI use in 
laboratories. Id. at *10–11. 
 18. Thompson, supra note 16, at 342–44. 
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against self-incrimination, are weighty enough to tip the balance in favor of 
a preemptive analysis of the admissibility of fMRI scans.19 The Supreme 
Court has noted time and again that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment 
is to protect the privacy inherent in the workings of an individual’s mind.20 
History has taught that without this essential privilege a government can 
abuse its powers and seek to use force, threats, and pressure to obtain 
information that would not have been voluntarily given.21 The evidence 
gleaned from excessive interrogatory pressure undermines the reliability of 
the judicial process.22 Thus, procedural and constitutional safeguards are 
essential to ensure the efficacy of our court system. It is imperative that we 
continue to evaluate the applicability and sufficiency of these safeguards as 
technology advances. 
II.  Brain Scans and the Constitution 
A defendant can be compelled to produce material evidence that is 
incriminating. Fingerprints, blood samples, voice exemplars, handwriting 
specimens, or other items of physical evidence may be extracted from a 
defendant against his will. But can he be compelled to use his mind to 
assist the prosecution in convicting him of a crime? I think not. 
—Justice John Paul Stevens23 
Because an fMRI brain scan reveals the mental reaction of a subject 
in response to a particular stimulus—for example, recognition in response 
to a picture—the scan necessarily implicates an individual’s right not to 
reveal that information, the fact of the recognition. The Supreme Court 
has consistently affirmed the Fifth Amendment’s provision that no person 
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.24 The Fifth Amendment 
is designed to insulate individuals from the “cruel trilemma” of self-
incrimination, perjury, or contempt in the face of interrogatory pressure by 
the state.25 This fundamental privilege protects citizens from torture and 
compulsion during interrogation.26 Devices that enable the government to 
access information that would ordinarily have to be offered voluntarily by 
an individual allow the government to circumvent this integral protection. 
 
 19. Id. at 344. 
 20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
460 (1966); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). 
 21. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (“Historically, the privilege sprang from 
an abhorrence of governmental assault against the single individual accused of crime and the 
temptation on the part of the State to resort to the expedient of compelling incriminating evidence 
from one’s own mouth.”). 
 22. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
 23. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–38 (2000). 
 24. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V; Doe II, 487 U.S. at 210. 
 25. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597. 
 26. Couch, 409 U.S. at 327. 
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It is imperative, therefore, that the law progress as quickly as technology 
advances. 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona 
established a respect for “the inviolability of the human personality” that 
“demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce 
the evidence against him by its own independent labors.”27 In Schmerber 
v. California,28 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment protects 
the accused from testifying against himself or providing the state with 
“evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,” unless the 
government provides appropriate constitutional safeguards.29 Evidence 
that is protected under the Fifth Amendment requires the prophylactic 
Miranda warning, which can only be waived voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently, so that the “inherently compelling pressures” of interrogation 
do not “undermine the individual’s will to resist . . . [or] compel him to 
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”30 However, the Fifth 
Amendment, and therefore Miranda, only protects evidence that is 
(1) testimonial, (2) compelled, and (3) incriminating.31 fMRI scans blur the 
lines of traditional evidentiary distinctions and, in so doing, call into 
question the effectiveness of these safeguards. 
A. A Cruel Trilemma 
The fMRI brain scan produces testimonial evidence because it 
forces the participant “to disclose the contents of his own mind” and to 
reveal incriminating information.32 The nature of the evidence revealed 
by fMRI brain scans differentiates it from mere physical evidence. Physical 
evidence is limited to “an identifying physical characteristic” of an 
individual, such as a handwriting exemplar, a blood sample, or 
fingerprint.33 Physical evidence is distinct from testimonial evidence and 
 
 27. 384 U.S. at 460. 
 28. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that the compulsion of a blood test in a hospital from a 
seemingly intoxicated driver did not involve any testimonial compulsion or forced communication by 
the driver and therefore did not infringe upon his Fifth Amendment right). 
 29. Id. at 761. 
 30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 31. This dispositive, three-prong test was promulgated by the Supreme Court in Doe v. United 
States (Doe II). 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1987). The Court has since applied it consistently when analyzing 
whether evidence is testimonial in nature and thus privileged under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., 
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applies to acts that imply assertions of fact.”); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–
38 (2000) (“[T]o be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate 
a factual assertion or disclose information.”). 
 32. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). For a discussion of why fMRI brain scans 
constitute incriminating evidence, see infra Part II.C. 
 33. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
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not afforded the protections of the Fifth Amendment because physical 
evidence does not communicate personal beliefs or knowledge of facts.34 
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court discussed the 
admissibility of a blood sample, taken in a hospital, which showed the 
patient-driver’s blood alcohol level was above the state limit.35 The 
defendant alleged that the admissibility of the analysis of the blood test 
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.36 The 
Court noted that the driver’s self-incrimination was irrelevant because 
the evidence consisted only of the chemical analysis of his blood and 
contained no testimony or communication.37 The Court distinguished the 
physical nature of the blood sample from the communicative nature of 
testimonial evidence.38 Relying on Holt v. United States, the Court found 
that the Fifth Amendment prohibition of compelled communication does 
not preclude using the “body as evidence when it may be material,” and 
to hold otherwise would “forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare 
his features with a photograph in proof.”39 Thus, in Schmerber, because 
the blood sample was material to the issue in dispute, contained no 
testimonial component, and was merely a physical sample of the driver, it 
did not implicate the protections of the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
recognized that federal and state courts had declined to extend the Fifth 
Amendment to “fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to 
write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a 
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.”40 Ultimately, the Court 
distinguished communication and testimony, the latter being privileged 
from “compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real 
or physical evidence.’”41 
Just a year after Schmerber, the Court again analyzed how physical 
evidence is distinct from testimony and why it is not afforded the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment.42 In United States v. Wade, the 
defendant argued that having to stand in a lineup and speak words heard 
by witnesses to a robbery violated his Fifth Amendment right against 
 
 34. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990) (citing Doe II, 487 U.S. at 210–11). 
 35. 384 U.S. at 758–59. 
 36. Id. at 759. The defendant also raised other constitutional issues, but those are not relevant to 
the current inquiry. 
 37. Id. at 765. 
 38.  Id. at 761. 
 39. Id. at 763 (quoting Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910)). In Holt, the Court 
found that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when he was compelled to put 
on a blouse to see if it fit. Holt, 218 U.S. at 252–53. 
 40. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967). 
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self-incrimination.43 The Court noted that the lineup was an analysis of a 
physical feature of the defendant’s body, identification of which was 
material to the case.44 Relying on Holt and Schmerber, the Court found 
that compelling the defendant to speak the words purportedly uttered by 
the robber—in essence to give a sample of his voice—did not constitute 
government compulsion of testimony.45 Rather, Wade was merely 
“required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic.”46 
In Gilbert v. California, the prosecution admitted samples of the 
defendant’s handwriting into evidence.47 On appeal, the defendant alleged 
that admitting his handwriting sample violated his Fifth Amendment 
rights.48 The Court found that, although handwriting and speaking were 
modes of communicating, it did not follow that every compulsion of an 
accused to demonstrate his voice or handwriting compelled 
communication.49 The defendant in Gilbert did not claim that the 
handwriting sample’s content was testimonial, and the Court held that “a 
mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, 
like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic” 
outside the purview of the Fifth Amendment.50 
From Holt through Wade, Gilbert, and Schmerber, the Court has 
drawn a distinction between evidence that communicates content and 
evidence that is a physical characteristic used to identify the accused. 
Despite this seemingly clear rule, however, determining what evidence is 
privileged under the Fifth Amendment is not always simple. The Court 
addressed the substantial gray area between physical and testimonial 
evidence more recently in Pennsylvania v. Muniz.51 There, the Court held 
that the slurred speech of a defendant who had been pulled over for 
allegedly driving drunk was not privileged under the Fifth Amendment 
and was admissible without Miranda warnings.52 As in Wade, where a 
defendant was compelled to reveal the properties of his voice by speaking 
in front of witnesses,53 the Court in Muniz found that the slurred speech 
and lack of muscular coordination revealed by the defendant’s responses 
to questions were not testimonial components of those responses.54 The 
 
 43. 388 U.S. at 220–21. 
 44. Id. at 222–23. 
 45. Id. at 221–22. 
 46. Id. at 222–23. 
 47. 388 U.S. at 266. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 266–67. 
 51. See generally 496 U.S. 582 (1990). 
 52. Id. at 590. 
 53. Wade, 388 U.S. at 222–23. 
 54. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590–91. 
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Court drew a bright line between the manner in which a defendant speaks, 
which is neither testimonial nor entitled to protection under the Fifth 
Amendment, and the content of his speech, which is protected.55 Thus, in 
order to determine whether evidence is physical or testimonial, we must 
look to whether the evidence is being offered to identify the defendant or 
to prove that the defendant communicated something in particular. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment protects 
“an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take,”56 when 
they relate to “express or implied assertions of fact or belief.”57 In Doe v. 
United States (Doe II), the Court addressed a circuit split and defined 
testimonial evidence protected by the Fifth Amendment.58 In that case, 
the defendant was issued a court order to sign a consent form that would 
authorize two foreign banks to disclose whether he had accounts with 
them.59 The defendant contended that the directive violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.60 In Doe II, however, the 
Court found that the directive did not implicate the Fifth Amendment 
because it merely authorized the bank to provide information and did 
not compel the defendant to disclose “any knowledge he might have.”61 
The Court distinguished between requiring a defendant to authorize a 
third party to disclose information and requiring the defendant himself to 
reveal that information. In order for a defendant to successfully claim 
that evidence is testimonial, the evidence must expressly or impliedly 
disclose the defendant’s knowledge or beliefs. 
Similarly in Muniz, the defendant was asked a series of questions 
during a field sobriety test.62 The Court determined that physical 
manifestations of his responses—including slurred speech and lack of 
muscle coordination—were not testimonial,63 yet it held that the content 
of his responses was testimonial.64 For example, the accused was asked if 
 
 55. Id. at 592. 
 56. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966). 
 57. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000) (citing Muniz, 496 U.S. at 594–98); see Hiibel 
v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (quoting Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 
210 (1988)). 
 58. 487 U.S. at 219. Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Fifth Circuit, along with the 
Second and Eleventh Circuits, held that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated by a court order 
compelling consent to the disclosure of foreign bank records. See In re Doe, No. 86-2663, 812 F.2d 
1404 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1987), aff’d, 487 U.S. 201; United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1039–40 (2d 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 1984). Conversely, a divided panel of 
the First Circuit held that such an order violates the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 814 F.2d 791, 793–96 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 59. Doe II, 487 U.S. at 203. 
 60. Id. at 207. 
 61. Id. at 217 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967)). 
 62. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 585 (1990). 
 63. Id. at 592. 
 64. Id. at 598. 
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he knew the date of his sixth birthday, and the Court found that the “the 
trier of fact could infer from Muniz’s answer (that he did not know the 
proper date) that his mental state was confused.”65 The Court made an 
important distinction between the physical characteristics of Muniz’s 
speech and its content in determining what was protected under the Fifth 
Amendment: “The correct question for present purposes is whether the 
incriminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial 
act or from physical evidence.”66 The Court in Muniz stated that the 
blood test in Schmerber fell outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment 
“not simply because the evidence concerned the suspect’s physical body, 
but rather because the evidence was obtained in a manner that did not 
entail any testimonial act on the part of the suspect.”67 
Conversely, the defendant in Muniz was posed a question to which 
he formed a response. Relying on the line of cases that culminated in 
Doe II, the Court found that 
[t]he Schmerber line of cases does not draw a distinction between 
unprotected evidence sought for its physical characteristics and 
protected evidence sought for its [other] content. Rather, the Court 
distinguished between the suspect’s being compelled himself to serve 
as evidence and the suspect’s being compelled to disclose or 
communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to 
incriminating evidence.68 
Thus in Muniz, privilege under the Fifth Amendment turned not on 
whether the defendant’s impaired faculties could “be characterized as an 
aspect of his physiology, but rather whether Muniz’s response to the sixth 
birthday question that gave rise to the inference of such an impairment 
was testimonial in nature.”69 Because this question compelled Muniz to 
disclose his knowledge—or lack thereof—a fact, it fell squarely within 
the definition promulgated by the Court in Doe II and was found to be 
privileged.70 The Court ordered Muniz’s response suppressed, vacated 
the Pennsylvania state court’s decision, and remanded for a new trial 
consistent with the Court’s holding.71 
The purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to prohibit the state from 
extracting “self-condemnation.”72 In Curcio v. United States, the Court 
noted that the privilege was implicated when the government attempted 
 
 65. Id. at 592 (emphasis omitted). 
 66. Id. at 593. 
 67. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 68. Id. at 594 n.7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 211 
n.10 (1988)). 
 69. Id. at 593–94. 
 70. Id. at 594–95. 
 71. Id. at 605–06. 
 72. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973). 
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to compel an accused “to disclose the contents of his own mind.”73 In Doe 
II, the Court found that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment is satisfied 
“when the privilege is asserted to spare the accused from having to 
reveal, directly or indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the 
offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the 
Government.”74 Even tests that are designed to measure involuntary 
physiological responses to interrogation may actually elicit results that 
are testimonial, and those must be afforded Fifth Amendment 
protection.75 This recognition by the Court opens up other non-verbal 
forms of communication to protection under the Fifth Amendment. 
In two cases involving document subpoenas, United States v. Doe 
(Doe I) and Fisher v. United States, the Court recognized that the act of 
producing subpoenaed documents, not in and of itself the making of a 
statement, might nonetheless invoke the Fifth Amendment.76 Citing both 
Doe I and Fisher, the Court concluded in Doe II that, “by producing 
documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness would admit that 
the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were 
authentic,” and in doing so would make an implicit statement of fact.77 
Thus, the Court stated “that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applies [equally] to acts that imply assertions of fact.”78 
More recently, in United States v. Hubbell, the Court held that, separate 
from the content of the document in question, the relevant compelled 
testimony was “the testimony inherent in the act of producing those 
documents.”79 Following the line of reasoning established in Doe I and 
Doe II, Fisher, and Schmerber, the Court in Hubbell also recognized that 
a defendant’s reaction to a subpoena constitutes testimony because it 
implies that the defendant knows about the existence of the documents 
in question.80 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overemphasize the act of 
disclosing testimonial evidence. Hubbell does not establish a test for 
determining whether evidence is testimonial based on the process of 
 
 73. 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). 
 74. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988). 
 75. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). The Court, in dicta, discussed the 
admissibility of polygraph tests and noted that the involuntary physiological reaction was inextricably 
tied to the communicative nature of the evidence. Although polygraph tests have generally fallen into 
disrepute, Schmerber exemplifies the Court’s willingness to protect evidence that comprises both a 
communicative and physical response. Id. 
 76. United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 
394, 396 (1976). 
 77. Doe II, 487 U.S at 209. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 530 U.S. 27, 40 (2000). 
 80. Id. at 34–35. 
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gathering the information. Hubbell, along with Fisher and Doe I, only 
stands for the proposition that testimonial evidence is not limited to 
verbal utterances. As the Court stated in Schmerber, the Fifth 
Amendment protects testimonial communications, “whatever form they 
might take.”81 Further, as noted in Muniz, “nonverbal conduct contains a 
testimonial component whenever the conduct reflects the actor’s 
communication of his thoughts to another.”82 What emerges from these 
cases is a definition of testimonial evidence comprised of a response by 
the accused that expressly or implicitly discloses his knowledge of facts. 
Therefore, the definition of testimonial evidence is not limited to speech or 
even to active, voluntary disclosures. If the definition of testimonial were 
“active” or “voluntary” disclosure of knowledge or belief, it would 
conflate the first prong—testimonial—with the second prong—
compulsion—of the Supreme Court’s three-part test. This cannot be what 
the Supreme Court intended for two reasons. First, because testimonial 
evidence offered voluntarily, even if incriminating, does not always require 
Miranda warnings.83 Second, because even when Miranda warnings are 
properly administered, the Fifth Amendment still prohibits the admission 
of coerced or compelled testimony.84 
The essential analysis to determine whether the content of fMRI 
brain scans is testimony and thus privileged under the Fifth Amendment 
is whether the content discloses the subject’s “express or implied 
assertions of facts or beliefs.”85 fMRI brain scans cannot be categorized 
as physical evidence because the images the scans create are not mere 
“identifying characteristics.” Rather, fMRI brain scan results 
communicate the mental reaction of the subject to particular stimuli in 
real time.86 Physical changes in the oxygenation of blood in the brain in 
response to these stimuli cannot be separated from the information they 
 
 81. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966). “A nod or head-shake is as much a 
‘testimonial’ or ‘communicative’ act in this sense as are spoken words.” Id. at 761 n.5. 
 82. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595 n.9 (1990). 
83. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297–298 (1990) (holding that an inmate’s voluntary disclosure 
of incriminating evidence to an undercover police officer he believed to be a fellow inmate did not 
violate the requirements of Miranda); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (stating that 
outside of a custodial interrogation, volunteered “statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth 
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the] holding today”). 
 84. Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (noting that even after 
Miranda, the voluntariness of a confession is an issue of due process, determined by assessing the 
totality of the circumstances), with Oregon v. Elstad, 467 U.S. 649, 670 (1984) (“Despite the fact that 
patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution's 
case, the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for impeachment purposes on cross-
examination.”). 
 85. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35 (citing Muniz, 496 U.S. at 594–98). 
 86. fMRI scans, which reveal mental reactions in real time, do not expose a mere “stagnant 
physical characteristic but a dynamic process whose unfolding communicates information.” Holloway, 
supra note 15, at 170. 
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convey.87 Without the subject’s response, the fMRI scan would have 
nothing to reveal. Prior to this technology, the information the fMRI 
discloses would have been invisible and unobtainable unless affirmatively 
disclosed by the subject. By revealing a measure of the interior workings of 
the subject’s brain, however, fMRI brain scans force the subject to take 
“the mental and physical steps necessary to provide . . . incriminating 
evidence.”88 Technology has advanced beyond the roughly hewn categories 
of “testimonial” and “physical” used to distinguish evidence protected by 
the Fifth Amendment from evidence that may be properly compelled with 
mere probable cause.89 That technology is blurring this line, however, does 
not negate the fact that the fMRI scan communicates the subject’s 
knowledge of facts. As the Court stated in Schmerber, to “compel a 
person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine 
his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether 
willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth 
Amendment.”90 
It is imperative that technology not outpace the fundamental 
protections afforded the accused. Constitutional standards, such as those 
provided by the Fifth Amendment, play a critical role in ensuring that 
evidence admitted in court is reliable and that defendants receive a full 
and fair trial. Advances in technology should not undermine these 
cardinal policies of our criminal justice system. Rather than continue to 
sort evidence into two bins, courts should consider whether the evidence is 
a response by the accused that expressly or implicitly discloses his 
knowledge of facts. If the answer to this question is yes, then the evidence 
should be privileged under the Fifth Amendment and require Miranda 
warnings to ensure that this evidence is not unwittingly surrendered. 
B. Techniques of Persuasion 
Compulsion is the second prong of the Supreme Court’s test for 
determining whether evidence is afforded Fifth Amendment protection.91 
 
 87. Id. at 172–73. 
 88. Id. at 172 (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42). 
 89. “There will be many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn. Some tests 
seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence,’ for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in 
body function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are 
essentially testimonial. . . . Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege 
is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 
(1966) (internal citation omitted). 
 90. Id. 
 91. The Court laid the framework for this test in Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 207 
(1987). The Court has since applied it consistently when analyzing whether evidence is testimonial in 
nature and thus privileged under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 
U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to acts that 
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In Miranda, the Supreme Court noted that evidence obtained while an 
individual is in police custody is presumed to have been compelled in the 
absence of prophylactic constitutional safeguards because of the 
“antagonistic forces” and “techniques of persuasion” frequently used in 
custodial interrogations.92 The admissibility of evidence obtained after a 
person indicates he does not want to be interrogated turns on whether 
his request was “scrupulously honored.”93 In fact, if an individual 
indicates that he does not want to answer the government’s questions, he 
must not be interrogated.94 Compulsion is also found where, considering 
the circumstances of the interrogation, the free will of the witness has 
been oppressed.95 
Today, fMRI brain scans are not portable and would presumably be 
administered only after an accused was in custody. Even though 
measuring the subject’s mental response to stimuli with an fMRI scan is 
analogous to asking questions, it is not the same as, for example, the 
questions posed in Muniz and the defendant’s verbal responses. In order 
to analyze the applicability of the compulsion prong of the Court’s three-
prong test, we must determine if and when a brain scan constitutes 
custodial interrogation. In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court addressed the 
meaning of “interrogation” under Miranda v. Arizona.96 In Miranda, the 
Court concluded that, in the context of custodial interrogation, certain 
procedural safeguards are necessary to protect an accused’s Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.97 In that case, the Court broadly defined 
interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after 
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way.”98 However, in Innis, the Court 
noted that the Miranda Court had been concerned not just with express 
questioning, but with “the ‘interrogation environment’ . . . [that] would 
‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby 
undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.”99 
 
imply assertions of fact.”); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–38 (2000) (“[T]o be testimonial, 
an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose 
information.”). 
 92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“One 
of [the Fifth Amendment’s] purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological 
domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him 
of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”). 
 93. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). 
 94. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
 95. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 
534, 544 (1961)). 
 96. 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980). 
 97. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
 98. Id. at 444. 
 99. 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58). 
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The Innis Court defined interrogation while in custody as involving 
either express questioning or the “functional equivalent” where police or 
government conduct is “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response.”100 In Innis, the conversation between officers that resulted in 
the accused’s statements did not fit either definition of interrogation, and 
the Court noted specifically that the officers’ remarks were in no way 
designed to elicit a response.101 Conversely, fMRI brain scans are intricate 
machines that are designed expressly to elicit a subject’s response to 
stimuli. Furthermore, fMRI brain scans disclose the reaction of a subject to 
particular stimuli and are therefore the functional equivalent of an 
interrogation. The scans are “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response” and thus should be subjected, like all custodial interrogations, to 
the procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda.102 
The Court in Innis was quick to note that not all statements of an 
accused while in custody are considered the product of interrogation and 
reaffirmed that statements given freely and voluntarily are admissible in 
evidence in the absence of Miranda warnings. Still, given the nuance of 
fMRI brain scan technology and the rarity of its current use, the 
government should take extra care to ensure the safeguards provided by 
Miranda are met.103 Thus, special care should be taken to ensure that 
consent to fMRI brain scans meets the requirements of Miranda and the 
information disclosed by the results is in fact freely and voluntarily given. 
One of the central purposes of the Fifth Amendment is “to prevent the 
state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming 
the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of 
the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his 
conviction.”104 Although the privilege was historically a protection 
against the use of torture and threats, advancements in technology like 
fMRI brain scans implicate the same constitutional problems. In essence, 
the brain scan removes an accused’s ability to refrain from disclosing his 
responses to questioning. Once he is in the machine, his response to such 
stimuli—that is, his testimony—is revealed. He no longer possesses the 
freedom to decide whether to assist the state; he cannot divert the flow of 
blood within his brain or mask the information it reveals. Thus brain scan 
 
 100. Id. at 302. 
 101. Id. at 303 n.9. 
 102. Id. at 301. 
 103. The scarcity of the technology of fMRI brain scans and the recognition of the human mind as 
an “inviolab[le],” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460, “private inner sanctum,” Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322, 327 (1973), is reminiscent of the Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). In 
Kyllo, the Court found that thermal imaging of a home using advanced technology constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment because of the rarity of the technology in use and because of the 
inherent privacy interest in a person’s home. 533 U.S. at 39–40. 
 104. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967). 
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administration procedures must meet the highest standards of consent in 
order to avoid infringing upon a person’s Fifth Amendment rights. 
Specifically, the subject should be made fully aware of the capacity of the 
machine to reveal what he would choose to hide and, knowing that, given 
the opportunity to refuse the test. 
For example, consider whether an accused can consent to an fMRI 
brain scan without an attorney present. Traditionally, an accused’s 
constitutional right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of criminal 
proceedings against him.105 However, “when the process shifts from 
investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its 
purpose is to elicit a confession . . . the accused must be permitted to 
consult with his lawyer.”106 Furthermore, an individual’s failure to make 
an explicit request for a lawyer while in police custody does not waive his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.107 The extension of the right to 
counsel in certain pretrial situations, such as interrogation in police 
custody, recognizes that the results of the confrontation may determine 
an accused’s guilt and reduce the trial to a mere formality.108 Given the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that the right to counsel “embodies a 
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does 
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself,”109 the fMRI scan 
may be one instance that necessitates the presence of counsel to ensure 
that the capacity of the test is not downplayed and consent is real. In 
weighing fundamental constitutional rights against the government’s 
need to effectively investigate crimes, it is imperative that the 
constitutional and procedural safeguards that protect verbal testimony 
are available to protect testimony that is disclosed via advances in 
technology such as those revealed by fMRI brain scans. 
C. A Link in the Chain 
To activate the protections of the Fifth Amendment, the testimony 
the accused is compelled to disclose must be incriminating.110 Incriminating 
evidence provides “a link in the chain” of evidentiary support needed to 
prosecute an individual for a crime.111 Evidence is incriminating within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment if it significantly enhances the likelihood 
 
 105. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–89 (1972). 
 106. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). 
 107. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. 
 108. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 224 (1967)). 
 109. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938). 
 110. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). 
 111. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
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of prosecution or if it facilitates conviction.112 In Miranda, the Court noted 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege “protects the individual from being 
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish 
degrees of incrimination.”113 Incriminating evidence need not be 
condemning; in fact, the government may use seemingly innocuous 
responses from an innocent party against that person, and such responses 
would still be entitled to Fifth Amendment protection.114 
Given the broad definition of “incriminating,” it is likely that nearly 
every fMRI brain scan will satisfy the incriminating element of the 
Court’s three-prong test for testimonial evidence. For example, fMRI 
brain scans have the ability to disclose that a subject has knowledge of a 
particular place or person by revealing increased blood flow to the 
brain’s memory center in response to images of that person or place. If 
the scan’s results indicate that the subject has knowledge of a particular 
fact, and that fact furnishes an evidentiary link to the issue at trial, it 
satisfies the incriminating prong. Thus it is not that fMRI scans can 
divulge our darkest secrets, it is that they can reveal what we know and 
recognize, which may be all that the government is looking for. 
Conclusion 
fMRI brain scanning is a complex and nuanced technology that 
tracks, in real time, the subject’s responses to pictures or facts. This 
technology removes the subject’s ability to exercise his constitutional 
right to end an interrogation once a question has been asked because no 
affirmative or voluntary action on the part of the subject is needed for 
the fMRI to record his response. Thus, the technology is invasive enough 
to disclose the subject’s responses and knowledge against her volition. 
Before this technology existed, the type of information fMRI brain scans 
disclose would have been invisible and unobtainable unless voluntarily 
and affirmatively disclosed by the subject. Further, the subject would 
have been free to terminate the interrogation at any time, particularly in 
response to a question that the subject did not want to answer. In 
measuring the subject’s mental response, an fMRI brain scan forces the 
subject to take the “mental and physical steps necessary” to provide the 
government with incriminating evidence, regardless of whether a subject 
wishes to respond to the question or to invoke his right against self-
incrimination.115 Because of the invasiveness of this technology, it is 
 
 112. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968). 
 113. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
 114. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 
(1957)) (“[O]ne of the Fifth Amendment’s ‘basic functions . . . is to protect innocent men . . . who 
otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’” (emphasis omitted)). 
 115. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 42 (2000). 
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imperative that any use be subject to the most stringent procedural 
safeguards. 
fMRI brain scan results must be considered privileged evidence 
protected by an individual’s Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness 
against himself. fMRI brain scans disclose the contents of the subject’s 
mind and allow the government to extract self-incriminating knowledge 
without having to derive that information independently. The 
admissibility of fMRI brain scans, if found reliable, should turn on 
whether the scan is compelled by the government. Holding otherwise 
would enable the government to invade the inner sanctum of an 
individual’s mind and strip citizens of a fundamental constitutional 
protection. The government can read our minds, and the Constitution 
should protect us. 
 
